Strategic party heterogeneity
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2016, vol. 28, issue 3, 408-430
Political parties field heterogeneous candidates and send a variety of messages about their policy positions. Yet most voting models maintain that office-seeking parties should enforce intraparty homogeneity and cultivate clear party reputations. This article reconciles theory with reality by identifying a strategic rationale for parties to pursue heterogeneity. I develop a model in which two parties each select a distribution of potential candidates to compete in an upcoming election. The model demonstrates that well-positioned parties should indeed offer homogeneous candidate teams, but that parties with platforms distant from the median voter should cast a wide net. Extensions allow for multiple candidate signals, voters who care about party platforms and candidatesâ€™ positions, and voter uncertainty.
Keywords: Ambiguity; Downsian model; party heterogeneity; party reputation; party strategy; polarization; screening; uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:28:y:2016:i:3:p:408-430
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