Policy dynamics and electoral uncertainty in the appointments process
David M Primo and
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Jinhee Jo: Department of Political Science, Kyung Hee University, Korea
David M Primo: Department of Political Science and Simon Business School, University of Rochester, USA
Yoji Sekiya: Independent Scholar
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2017, vol. 29, issue 1, 124-148
By incorporating electoral uncertainty and policy dynamics into three two-period models of the appointments process, we show that gridlock may not always occur under divided government, contrary to the findings of static one-shot appointments models. In these cases, contrary to the ally principle familiar to students of bureaucratic politics, the president or the confirmer is willing to move the court away from his or her ideal point as a way to insulate against worse outcomes in period two. By demonstrating how a simple set of changes to a workhorse model can change equilibrium outcomes significantly, this paper provides a foundation for reconsidering the static approach to studying political appointments.
Keywords: Interbranch bargaining; appointments; gridlock; divided government; courts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:29:y:2017:i:1:p:124-148
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