Working smart and hard? Agency effort, judicial review, and policy precision
Ian R Turner
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2017, vol. 29, issue 1, 69-96
The lionâ€™s share of policy in the United States is made by administrative agencies. Agencies not only make policy choices , they must also implement policy effectively. Oversight institutions play an integral role in the policymaking process by monitoring, through review of agency policy actions, both policymaking tasks. Through analysis of a formal model I develop a theory of policymaking between agencies and courts and show that review can impact agency effort choices even when bureaucratic subversion is not a concern. At times the court has no impact on this effort and the agency is unconstrained. However, when the agencyâ€™s effort dictates whether or not the court defers to the agencyâ€™s actions judicial review does affect effort decisions. In this setting, review can either strengthen or, counter-intuitively, weaken agency effort incentives. Implications for executive and congressional oversight are discussed in light of these results.
Keywords: Bureaucracy; formal theory; intergovernmental relations; judicial review; oversight; policymaking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:29:y:2017:i:1:p:69-96
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