Bargaining with a biased autocrat
Colin Krainin and
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Colin Krainin: Princeton University, USA
John Slinkman: Novetta, USA
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2017, vol. 29, issue 2, 273-298
This paper presents a specific dynamic extension to the model outlined by Jackson and Morelli (Political bias and war. The American Economic Review 97(4): 1353â€“1373). In particular, we focus on the implications of a long-lived leader who possesses bias towards or against war that potentially differs from the country (s)he represents. Bargaining and war outcomes are characterized in this environment. We emphasize three results: (1) war sometimes occurs only after substantial delay; (2) if it is possible to select a leader, a country will always select a leader who is biased towards war; (3) when the distribution of power is uneven, a country might select an aggressive leader who eventually leads the country into war. If applied in the context of a civil war model, the third result implies that particularly disadvantaged rebel groups might select aggressive leaders to bargain with the central government and, potentially, incite conflict.
Keywords: Bargaining; conflict; leaders; war (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:29:y:2017:i:2:p:273-298
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