Electoral competition with ideologically biased voters
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2017, vol. 29, issue 3, 415-439
This paper studies pork barrel spending in a model where two symmetric parties compete for an electorate consisting of groups which have different ideological preferences. In equilibrium, party electoral promises decrease with voter ideological biases, and a â€œswing voterâ€ outcome emerges. In this context, a problem of exclusion from party transfer plans arises which depends on ideology distribution. Groups with extreme ideological preferences are excluded from these plans, and also within moderate groups a share of voters receives a nil transfer from the parties. This exclusion problem is generally reduced if a transformation of the electorate occurs which decreases the polarization of the distribution of ideology.
Keywords: Exclusion from party transfer plans; ideology; pork barrel spending (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D63 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:29:y:2017:i:3:p:415-439
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