Hun Chung and
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Hun Chung: School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan
John Duggan: Department of Political Science and Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY, USA
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2018, vol. 30, issue 3, 272-305
We propose the solution concept of directional equilibrium for the multidimensional model of voting with general spatial preferences. This concept isolates alternatives that are stable with respect to forces applied by all voters in the directions of their gradients, and it extends a known concept from statistics for Euclidean preferences. We establish connections to the majority core, Pareto optimality, and existence and closed graph, and we provide non-cooperative foundations in terms of a local contest game played by voters.
Keywords: Equilibrium; geometric median; majority core; mediancentre; spatial median; spatial model; structure-induced equilibrium; utilitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:30:y:2018:i:3:p:272-305
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