Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in mixed-member proportional systems
Thomas BrÃ¤uninger and
Franz Urban Pappi
Additional contact information
Anna-Sophie Kurella: UniversitÃ¤t Mannheim, MZES, Germany
Thomas BrÃ¤uninger: UniversitÃ¤t Mannheim, FakultÃ¤t fÃ¼r Sozialwissenschaften, Germany
Franz Urban Pappi: UniversitÃ¤t Mannheim, MZES, Germany
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2018, vol. 30, issue 3, 306-334
How does competition for first (candidate) and second ballot (party-list) votes affect the strategic positioning of parties in mixed-member proportional systems? We study this question in a simulation study of multiparty competition in the two tiers. In the first step, we use data from elections for the German Bundestag to estimate individual vote function for each tier based on ideology, policy, and valence incentives. We then use these parameter estimates to calibrate a model in which parties compete for either first- or second-tier votes. Results suggest that parties may face a dilemma when adopting a positional strategy. When national parties and their candidates hold significantly different valences, large valence advantages generate centripetal incentives whereas smaller valences exert a centrifugal pull. Overall, centrifugal incentives dominate the German mixed-member system.
Keywords: Mixed electoral systems; Nash equilibrium; party competition; spatial model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:30:y:2018:i:3:p:306-334
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Theoretical Politics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().