Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2019, vol. 31, issue 4, 626-641
Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of votersâ€™ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72
Keywords: Elections; Political ambiguity; Public promise; Campaign platform; Probabilistic voting; Polarization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:31:y:2019:i:4:p:626-641
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