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Voting behavior under proportional representation

Peter Buisseret and Carlo Prato
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Peter Buisseret: Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2020, vol. 32, issue 1, 96-111

Abstract: Understanding voter preferences in proportional representation (PR) systems is an essential first step towards understanding candidate selection and behavior. We unearth conceptual challenges of constructing a theory of sincere voting in PR elections. Using a rich but tractable framework, we propose a foundational theory of voting behavior in list PR systems. We show how voters’ expectations about the election outcome shape the relative salience of different candidates on a party’s ballot and ultimately determine their induced preferences over a party’s list. Our framework shows how voters allocate their attention across different ranks on a party’s ballot, and how this depends on each party’s relative popularity.

Keywords: Proportional representation; voting behavior; political preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0951629819892342

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