Voting behavior under proportional representation
Peter Buisseret and
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Peter Buisseret: Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2020, vol. 32, issue 1, 96-111
Understanding voter preferences in proportional representation (PR) systems is an essential first step towards understanding candidate selection and behavior. We unearth conceptual challenges of constructing a theory of sincere voting in PR elections. Using a rich but tractable framework, we propose a foundational theory of voting behavior in list PR systems. We show how votersâ€™ expectations about the election outcome shape the relative salience of different candidates on a partyâ€™s ballot and ultimately determine their induced preferences over a partyâ€™s list. Our framework shows how voters allocate their attention across different ranks on a partyâ€™s ballot, and how this depends on each partyâ€™s relative popularity.
Keywords: Proportional representation; voting behavior; political preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:32:y:2020:i:1:p:96-111
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