Authoritarian election as an incentive scheme
Hao Hong and
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Hao Hong: Freddie Mac, Virginia, USA
Tsz-Ning Wong: Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel, Switzerland
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2020, vol. 32, issue 3, 460-493
Authoritarian rule requires teamwork of political elites. However, elite class members may lack incentive for the contribution of their efforts. In this paper, we develop a model to study the decision of authoritarian rulers to introduce elections. Our model suggests that elections can motivate the ruling class to devote more effort to public good provision. As a result, elections alleviate the moral-hazard-in-teams problem within the authoritarian government. Excessive electoral control hinders the introduction of elections, but mild electoral control facilitates it. Our findings offer a new perspective on understanding authoritarian elections and explain many stylized facts in authoritarian regimes.
Keywords: Authoritarian election; electoral control; moral hazard; incentive (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:32:y:2020:i:3:p:460-493
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