Power transfers, military uncertainty, and war

William Spaniel

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2020, vol. 32, issue 4, 538-556

Abstract: In many contexts, patrons wish to simultaneously increase a protégé’s military power while reducing the probability of war between that protégé and its enemy. Are these goals compatible? I show that the answer is yes when states face uncertainty over a class of military allotments. Arms transfers mitigate the information problem by making both strong and weak types behave more similarly. This encourages uninformed states to make safer demands, which decreases the probability of war. As a result, transfers to the informed actor both increase bargaining power and enhance efficiency under these conditions.

Keywords: Alliances; bargaining; military aid; war (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:32:y:2020:i:4:p:538-556

DOI: 10.1177/0951629820956304

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