The stability of multi-level governments

Enriqueta Aragonès and Clara Ponsatí
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Enriqueta Aragonès: Institut d’Anà lisi Econòmica-CSIC and Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2021, vol. 33, issue 1, 140-166

Abstract: This paper studies the stability of a multi-level government. We analyze an extensive form game played between two politicians leading two levels of government. We characterize the conditions that render such government structures stable. We also show that if leaders care about electoral rents and the preferences of the constituencies at different levels are misaligned, then the decentralized government structure may be unsustainable. This result is puzzling because, from a normative perspective, the optimality of decentralized decisions via a multi-level government structure is relevant precisely when different territorial constituencies exhibit preference heterogeneity.

Keywords: multi-level governments; repression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:33:y:2021:i:1:p:140-166

DOI: 10.1177/0951629820984852

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