Solving the guardianship dilemma by war

Jacque Gao

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2021, vol. 33, issue 4, 455-474

Abstract: This article develops a new theory of how dictators can solve the guardianship dilemma. I study a dynamic game to show that the dictator may build a large army and deal with the guardianship dilemma by resorting to international conflicts. Specifically, when a military revolt is imminent, the dictator can obtain enough resources to buy off the military by attacking and ultimately defeating his international opponent. The framework thus shows that a weakly institutionalized polity may either have a small military or have a large military and be more aggressive on the international stage.

Keywords: Diversionary war; dynamic game; gambling for resurrection; guardianship dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:33:y:2021:i:4:p:455-474

DOI: 10.1177/09516298211043235

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