Do supermajority rules really deter extremism? the role of electoral competition 1

Daiki Kishishita and Atsushi Yamagishi

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2022, vol. 34, issue 1, 127-144

Abstract: This study investigates how supermajority rules in a legislature affect electoral competition. We construct an extensive-form game wherein parties choose policy platforms in an election. Post election, the policy is determined based on a legislative voting rule. At symmetric equilibrium, supermajority rules induce divergence of policy platforms if and only if the parties are sufficiently attached to their preferred platform. Thus, supermajority rules may not always lead to moderate policies once electoral competition is considered.

Keywords: Divergence; Probabilistic voting; Supermajority; Legislative bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:34:y:2022:i:1:p:127-144

DOI: 10.1177/09516298211061161

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