Inefficient voting with identical voters

Ole-Andreas Elvik Naess

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2022, vol. 34, issue 2, 175-190

Abstract: This paper constructs a two-period electoral model where the future is uncertain and the policy in each period is decided by majority rule. The voters’ optimal future policy takes into account all possible future realizations, while the future pivotal median voter only cares about the median value of the future distribution. This dynamic conflict of interest implies that the electoral outcome may be strictly Pareto-dominated by other policies even in cases where all voters are identical and have the same beliefs for the future. I apply the model to analyze the dynamic incentives for redistribution.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:34:y:2022:i:2:p:175-190

DOI: 10.1177/09516298221085973

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