EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

(Not) Addressing issues in electoral campaigns

Salvador Barberà and Anke Gerber
Additional contact information
Salvador BarberÃ: Facultat d’Economia i Empresa, MOVE, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE, Bellaterra (Barcelona), Spain

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2023, vol. 35, issue 4, 259-291

Abstract: Two candidates competing for election may raise some issues for debate during the electoral campaign, while avoiding others. We present a model in which the decision to introduce an issue, or to reply to the opponent’s position on one that she raised, may change the further list of topics that end up being discussed. Candidates’ strategic decisions are driven by their appraisal of their expected vote share at the end of the campaign. Real phenomena observed during campaigns, like the convergence of the parties to address the same issues, or else their diverging choice on which ones to treat, or the relevance of issue ownership can be explained within our stark basic model. Most importantly, our analysis is based on a novel concept of equilibrium that avoids the (often arbitrary) use of predetermined protocols. This allows us to endogenously predict not only the list of topics that will be touched upon by each candidate, but also the order in which they will be addressed.

Keywords: Electoral campaigns; equilibrium sets of continuation campaigns; issues; issue convergence; issue divergence; issue ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09516298231202424 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:35:y:2023:i:4:p:259-291

DOI: 10.1177/09516298231202424

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Theoretical Politics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:35:y:2023:i:4:p:259-291