Explanatory pluralism in political science
Keith Dowding and
Charles Miller
Additional contact information
Keith Dowding: Department of Politics and International Relations, College of Arts and Social Sciences, 2219Australian National University Canberra, Canberra, ACT, Australia
Charles Miller: Department of Politics and International Relations, College of Arts and Social Sciences, 2219Australian National University Canberra, Canberra, ACT, Australia
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2026, vol. 38, issue 3, 159-176
Abstract:
Most writers on political science methods seem to suggest that explanation means causal explanation. Certainly, many explanations in the political sciences are causal. However, natural science often provides non-causal explanations, while non-causal explanations are recognized by philosophers of science. Causal inference, in itself, is not a causal explanation; it explains alongside theory. In this paper, we defend explanatory pluralism, arguing that many important explanations in political science are not causal in nature. We identify two important types of non-causal explanation – constitutive explanation (CE) and explanation by constraint (EC) – providing examples from the political sciences literature. We conclude by outlining what we believe non-causal explanation can contribute to political science.
Keywords: causal explanation; causal inference; constitutive explanation; explanation; explanation by constraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09516298251403391 (text/html)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:38:y:2026:i:3:p:159-176
DOI: 10.1177/09516298251403391
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Theoretical Politics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().