Barriers to Entry into a Political System

Gideon Doron and Moshe Maor

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1991, vol. 3, issue 2, 175-188

Abstract: The article develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of the conditions which affect the creation of barriers to entry into political systems. Its main argument is that parties in power increase structural barriers to enhance their interests when they perceive a threat to their own power. Perceived threat is influenced by changes in two dimensions of the political system: the level of innovation in an elective party system, and the level of mobility in a parliamentary system. An increase in the level of mobility in a parliamentary party system, alongside a decrease in the level of innovation in an elective party system, increases the level of perceived threat by the parties in power. An increase in the level of perceived threat is followed by a `barriers' strategy by the parties in power, and, conversely, a decrease in the level of perceived threat may be followed by a strategy of maintenance or even decrease of barriers to entry.

Keywords: barriers to entry; Israeli politics; Knesset; multi-party systems; party competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:175-188

DOI: 10.1177/0951692891003002004

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