Barriers to Entry and Political Competition

Randall Holcombe

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1991, vol. 3, issue 2, 231-240

Abstract: Models of electoral competition tend to focus on competition between parties, but there are more significant alliances among incumbents of different parties than between incumbents and non-incumbents of the same party. The coalition of incumbents uses barriers to entry to place challengers at a competitive disadvantage, which frees incumbents from having to strictly follow the desires of the voters. This enhances the benefits of holding office. Models of political competition that leave out the competition between incumbents and non-incumbents overlook the most significant dimension of political competition.

Keywords: barriers to entry; Congress; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:231-240

DOI: 10.1177/0951692891003002007

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