Games Real Actors Could Play: The Challenge of Complexity

Fritz W. Scharpf

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1991, vol. 3, issue 3, 277-304

Abstract: This paper continues the examination of the validity of game-theoretic explanations in empirical social science and policy research. Assuming that real actors with bounded rationality would be unable to cope with the explosive complexity of n -person games, discussion focuses on the conditions under which corporate actors and coalitions, as well as collective and even aggregate actors, may be legitimately treated as unitary players. In addition, the importance of functional differentiation and ingroup-outgroup segmentation for the segregation of game-like interactions is explored.

Keywords: composite actors; corporate actors; distrust; functional differentiation; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:3:y:1991:i:3:p:277-304

DOI: 10.1177/0951692891003003003

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