Institutional Incentives for Resource Mobilization

Rita M. Hilton

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1992, vol. 4, issue 3, 283-308

Abstract: This article examines the effect of institutional arrangements on resource mobilization in three irrigation systems in Nepal. Applying tools of institutional analysis, three hypotheses are tested. Specifically, these hypotheses concern the influence of (1) decision-making autonomy, (2) extent of external agency involvement and (3) reliability of water delivery on farmers' incentives to mobilize their own resources for system operation and maintenance costs. Findings indicate that: (1) the more control farmers have in system decisions, the more likely it is they will contribute their own resources; (2) indirect intervention tends to promote farmer financing of recurrent costs to a greater extent than does direct outside involvement; and (3) reliable water delivery is the key to effective local resource mobilization.

Keywords: institutional analysis; irrigation; Nepal; resource mobilization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:4:y:1992:i:3:p:283-308

DOI: 10.1177/0951692892004003003

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