The Implications of Self-Interest

Trudi C. Miller

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1992, vol. 4, issue 4, 395-412

Abstract: Consistent application of the assumption that individuals are motivated by self-interest leads to a populist policy prescription today. To increase political freedom under conservative (limited) democracy - and rates of economic growth under competitive capitalism - it is necessary to distribute income (money) directly to workers. Adam Smith's dual definition of self-interest (in terms of self-serving passions, as well as self-serving economic rationality) provides the primary basis for this policy prescription. Empirical support for Smith's dual definition of self-interest is provided by 20th-century findings on the structure and evolution of the human brain

Keywords: capitalism; democracy; income redistribution; prisoner's dilemma; self-interest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:4:y:1992:i:4:p:395-412

DOI: 10.1177/0951692892004004002

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