Problems in the Theory of Institutional Design
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1993, vol. 5, issue 4, 523-540
Many political institutions can be viewed as methods for achieving desired outcomes. The problem of institutional design is that of finding a mechanism that would result in those desired outcomes as game-theoretic equilibria. Some results from the institutional design literature are reviewed, and it is argued that many of them are based on assumptions that should be critically examined. We focus on behavioural and information-related assumptions as well as on the concepts of equilibria utilized in the institutional design literature.
Keywords: advantage model; equilibrium; expected utility theory; mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:523-540
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Journal of Theoretical Politics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().