Political Transaction-Cost Manipulation
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1994, vol. 6, issue 2, 189-216
This article shows linkages between a broadened transaction-cost theory of politics and prior studies analyzing governmental behavior such as agenda control, strategic use of information, cost concealment and cost dispersion. It develops a model of government manipulation of politically relevant transaction costs in order to facilitate both more comprehensive specification of the determinants of such political behavior and more accurate assessment of the likelihood and consequences of institutional change. The article presents a taxonomy that classifies conceptually various observed and potential forms of governmental transaction-cost manipulation.
Keywords: economics; institutional change; politics; transaction costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:6:y:1994:i:2:p:189-216
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