6. Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action

Elinor Ostrom

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1994, vol. 6, issue 4, 527-562

Abstract: Ignoring the impact of changes in physical capital on a form of social capital - the rules used in farmer-organized irrigation systems - can lead to the unintended consequence that the physical capital is not as productive as intended. Analysis focuses on the choice of rules made by farmers in homogeneous and heterogeneous situations. Using this analysis, it is possible to illustrate why many donor-funded improvements in physical capital have had counterproductive results.

Keywords: collective action; development; heterogeneity of capabilities; institutional choice; irrigation common-pool resources (CPRs) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:6:y:1994:i:4:p:527-562

DOI: 10.1177/0951692894006004006

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