7. The Conditions for Successful Collective Action
Gary D. Libecap
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1994, vol. 6, issue 4, 563-592
The purpose of this paper is to summarize some of the bargaining issues involved in collective action to address local common-pool problems and to illustrate them in three empirical cases. The importance of timing or the sequence of coalition building and the heterogeneity of the participant's preferences, information and stakes in the problem are emphasized. Two of the empirical cases involve traditional CPR problems and efforts to resolve them in fisheries and oil fields. The third involves collective action by private firms to obtain government assistance to control orange shipments so as to fix prices. Although the cases are quite different, with one involving a non-renewable resource, another a renewable resource and a third addressing cooperation for provision of an industry public good, the bargaining problems encountered among heterogeneous parties are very similar. This condition allows for generalizations to be drawn about the conditions for successful collective action.
Keywords: cartelization; collective action; common pool; fisheries; oil field unitization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:6:y:1994:i:4:p:563-592
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