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Intra-Party Determinants of Coalition Bargaining

Moshe Maor

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995, vol. 7, issue 1, 65-91

Abstract: Analyses of the impact of intra-party conflicts on coalition bargaining have generally concluded that, when intra-party conflicts occur, the more centralized the party structure, the more effective is the party as a coalition actor. This paper argues a concrete alternative which challenges the traditional view. It suggests that, when intra-party conflicts occur, organizational decentralization allows the party to handle conflicts in a variety of manageable ways without forcing members to leave the party. As a result, the party can enter into conflict-inducing coalition negotiations with other parties without risking its hold on its own members. A centralized organization, however, lacks the mechanisms necessary to adjust to dissent among its members and is therefore at a disadvantage when it enters parliamentary negotiations. This argument is strongly supported by a comparative analysis of intra-party conflicts and coalition governments in Denmark, Norway, Italy, France and the UK.

Keywords: bargaining power; conflict manifestation; conflict resolution; intra-party conflicts; legislative strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:7:y:1995:i:1:p:65-91