Voting Power under the EU Constitution

Jan-Erik Lane and Reinert Mæland

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995, vol. 7, issue 2, 223-230

Abstract: Decision making rules in the EU Council of Ministers need to be revised in light of enlargements since 1958. Under the qualified majority rules, the more countries join, the less the voting power of the large states, leading necessarily to coalition-building process, two possible examples of which are described. The situation would be less paradoxical if the EU were to adopt a single rule, the simple majority vote.

Keywords: coalition-building; decision-making rules; simple majority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:7:y:1995:i:2:p:223-230

DOI: 10.1177/0951692895007002007

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