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A Comprehensive Decision-Making Exposition of Coalition Politics

Gideon Doron and Martin Sherman

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995, vol. 7, issue 3, 317-333

Abstract: The question of the size of political coalitions is readdressed from the point of view of an `Expected Utility Maximizer' (EUM) framer who has to choose a certain formation in a given political environment. Three subjective utility profiles or aspirational motives are identified for the framer: aspiration regarding political return, aspiration regarding political stability and aspiration regarding political greatness. These are matched against five objective polity parameters: polarization, dimensionality, dichotomy, discreteness and plurality. Taken together they form a complex functional relationship. A change in any of the function specified variables would affect the size of the formed coalition.

Keywords: coalition politics; coalition framer aspirational motives; objective political environment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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