The `Noncompensatory Principle' of Coalition Formation

Alex Mintz

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1995, vol. 7, issue 3, 335-349

Abstract: This paper introduces the `noncompensatory principle' of coalition formation. This principle states that in a choice situation, a negative or low score on the political dimension cannot be compensated for with a positive score on other dimensions (see Mintz, 1993; Mintz and Geva, 1994a, b; Mintz et al., 1994). The link between the `noncompensatory principle' and the size of coalitions is then discussed. Based on the `noncompensatory' logic I propose that ceteris paribus, intra-party rivalry is likely to lead to the formation of coalitions larger than necessary to win, whereas inter-party conflict is more likely to lead to the formation of narrow coalitions. The Israeli examples of 1988 and 1990 demonstrate the applicability of this theme to real-world situations.

Keywords: coalition formation; decision-making; noncompensatory rules; Israeli politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:7:y:1995:i:3:p:335-349

DOI: 10.1177/0951692895007003006

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