Committee Gatekeeping and Proposal Power under Single and Multiple Referral

Garry Young

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1996, vol. 8, issue 1, 65-78

Abstract: A common feature of the legislative process in several American legislatures - especially the US House - is the referral of legislation to multiple committees. Multiple referral calls into question traditional interpretations of committee power and thus warrants careful theoretical analysis. This paper uses a basic spatial model to analyze the impact that multiple referral has on committee proposal and gatekeeping power. After discussing several implications yielded by the model, the paper tests - and finds support for - the hypothesis that multiple referral increases obstruction.

Keywords: multiple referral; spatial models; congressional committees; US Congress (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:8:y:1996:i:1:p:65-78

DOI: 10.1177/0951692896008001004

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