Institutional and Partisan Sources of Gridlock

Keith Krehbiel

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1996, vol. 8, issue 1, 7-40

Abstract: A spatial theory of the comparative consequences of unified and divided government clarifies the relationship between institutions, partisanship and gridlock. Under formally specified conditions, executive and legislative institutions are shown to inhibit but not prohibit the convergence of public policies to those most preferred by the legislative median voter. Extensions illustrate the theoretical robustness of the primary empirical expectation. Under all but extreme conditions, gridlock is a predictable consequence of super-majoritarian procedures. Gridlock occurs in divided and unified government alike, and in the presence of any degree of party strength. Concluding discussions speculate on the effects of alternative assumptions and on applications of the theoretical framework to settings other than US national government.

Keywords: Congress; presidency; formal theory; divided government (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:8:y:1996:i:1:p:7-40

DOI: 10.1177/0951692896008001002

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