Power and Political Coordination in American and German Multi-Chamber Legislation

Thomas König and Thomas Bräuninger

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1996, vol. 8, issue 3, 331-360

Abstract: Power in American and German multi-chamber legislation is determined either by an inter-institutional or an internal coalition problem of all inter-linked chambers. Hence, the complexity of multi-chamber systems relies on different subgames, different types of decision rules and different types of actors. Since collective actors such as parliaments or parliamentary chambers may not act as unitary actors, we examine the power distribution in both types of multi-chamber legislation by a game-theoretical method with regard to institutional settings and specific legislative schemes. We argue that the Shapley index is the most appropriate method for the comparative analysis of multi-chamber power. Our `parallel' research strategy is, thus, based on individual and corporate Shapley power shares which are subsequently added to collective chamber power. Our comparison of American and German legislation starts with an analysis of two-chamber parliamentary bargaining. Whereas this application corresponds to the bicameral parliamentary decision stage of conciliation and amending, our second application of Policy Leadership studies the checks-and-balances of all executive and legislative chamber actors. A third application is related to the situation of unified and divided government, and here we examine the power effects of institutional settings and party-oriented strategies in both types of multi-chamber legislation. In Germany, unified government excludes opposition actors, whereas American unified and divided government refers to the president's role in multi-chamber legislation.

Keywords: comparative politics; institutional power analysis; multi-chamber legislatures; game theory; Shapley index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:8:y:1996:i:3:p:331-360

DOI: 10.1177/0951692896008003002

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