Majority Voting with Bribes Does Not Eliminate Voting Cycles

Wing-Chung Pun

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1997, vol. 9, issue 1, 131-134

Abstract: This paper shows that majority voting with bribes cannot generate voting cycles when voters' preferences are separable in alternatives and money. When preferences are not separable in alternatives and money, voting cycles are possible under majority voting with bribes.

Keywords: arrow; logrolling; majority voting; voting paradox (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:9:y:1997:i:1:p:131-134

DOI: 10.1177/0951692897009001011

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