Rational Voters and Strategic Voting

Peter C. Ordeshook and Langche Zeng

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1997, vol. 9, issue 2, 167-187

Abstract: Is the rational-choice paradigm more than a mere tautology when applied to the study of voting or can it generate refutable propositions that cannot be deduced or inferred from other approaches? This is the question we address empirically in the context of three-candidate presidential elections. Although we reconfirm the conclusion that the decision to vote is largely a consumptive one, we also establish that once in the voting booth, voters act strategically in precisely the ways predicted by a Downsian model of voting. That is, although expected-utility calculations and the like and little to our understanding of the decision to vote, those same calculations have a significant influence on the decision for whom to vote, over and above such factors as partisanship.

Keywords: elections; rationality; strategies; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:167-187

DOI: 10.1177/0951692897009002002

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