Compact or Compound Republicanism?

Robert L. Perry and John D. Robertson

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1997, vol. 9, issue 3, 317-345

Abstract: This paper compares the logical foundations and classical interpretations of compact and compound theories of federalism as they apply to the emerging European federal authority. The study outlines the critical criteria by which one would ascertain the dominance of one model relative to that of the other within the emerging structure of authority across Europe. Operationalizing the critical institutional authority patterns governing the coordination of general property interests throughout European democracies, the study concludes that between 1955 and 1992, major European democracies have evolved toward a hybrid logic of institutional authority consistent more with a compound than a compact theory of federal authority. The sample consists of 14 European democracies.

Keywords: capital markets; federalism; Madison; Montesquieu; transaction costs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:9:y:1997:i:3:p:317-345

DOI: 10.1177/0951692897009003004

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