Nomenklatura Rule Under Democracy

Mario Ferrero and Giorgio Brosio

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1997, vol. 9, issue 4, 445-475

Abstract: This paper attempts to explain the puzzling features of the Italian political system up to 1992 by means of an economic model of a democratic Nomenklatura, in which the normal operation of a democratic system is distorted by the self-perpetuation of a ruling elite - `Nomenklatura' - which co-opts members of the opposition into its ranks to secure re-election and maximize per capita rent from political office. Competition for the field is thus suppressed and competition within the field enhanced. The Nomenklatura regime arose as a response to a non-democratic opposition and could not survive the downfall of Communism in the early 1990s. Thus the model yields an explanation for the regime's collapse after 1992.

Keywords: economics of democracy; Italian political system; Nomenklatura; political competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:9:y:1997:i:4:p:445-475

DOI: 10.1177/0951692897009004002

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