Probabilistic Graphs and Power Indices
Emilio Calvo () and
J. Javier Lasaga
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 1997, vol. 9, issue 4, 477-501
In this paper a method is offered for calculating the power of political parties in the Spanish parliament. This is a modification of the Shapley-Shubik index which allows the ideological affinities between parties to be taken into account. It extends Myerson's model of games with restricted communication. A version of Hart and Kurz's model is also used to study the stability of government coalitions.
Keywords: graph; power index; stability; voting game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:9:y:1997:i:4:p:477-501
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