 Peace by Empire? Conflict Outcomes and International Stability, 1816-1976Zeev Maoz
Journal of Peace Research, 1984, vol. 21, issue 3, 227-241 Abstract: This study attempts to explore the relationship between dispute outcomes and international stability. Stability is defined as a period characterized by the absence of violent-ridden or violent-prone interactions among states. Two models of international stability are discussed. The 'peace by empire' model posits that stability tends to increase following decisive victories and imposed settlements in which the victors subdue the losers. The 'prudence in victory' model contends that stability is enhanced following symmetrical outcomes in which the grievance of the parties toward the post-dispute status quo are minimized. A test of these models on a random sample of serious interstate disputes between 1816-1976 suggests that: a) Both nation level outcomes (i.e., the identity of the winners and losers) and dyadic level outcomes (i.e., the mode of resolution or non-resolution of the dispute) are significantly related to the degree of subsequent stability, b) This relationship is consistent with the expectations of the 'peace by empire' model but inconsistent with the expectations of the 'prudence in victo ry' model. However, c) winners of past disputes — even those that ended in imposed settlements — are fre quently forced to initiate subsequent disputes in order to preserve past achievements. Date: 1984 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:21:y:1984:i:3:p:227-241 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Journal of Peace Research from Peace Research Institute Oslo |
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