Strategic Models for a De-Polarizing World

Amitai Etzioni
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Amitai Etzioni: Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, New York

Journal of Peace Research, 1965, vol. 2, issue 2, 136-145

Abstract: An analysis of de-polarization draws on four analytical models. The traditional balance- of-power analysis suggests that as the level of integration of the two blocs (East and West) declines, the number of possible political combinations increases, foreign policy gains in the number of political options, the probability of a military showdown declines, and the ideological fervor is expected to be reduced. The balance-of-terror, the model behind deterrence, is weakened by the appearance of an increasing number of small nuclear powers, and it is expected to be further undermined by more nuclear powers with a growing nuclear capability. This is an unbalancing trend. Game-theory is used to point out the non-zero-sum characteristics of the de-polarizing system and the pay- offs it offers to all sides. Psychological analysis is employed to suggest that, bi-polarity is frustrating for both blocs, while a competition limited by rules would allow some ex pression to the legitimate drives of all sides.

Date: 1965
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:2:y:1965:i:2:p:136-145

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