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Learning and Affect i n iNternational Politics

John R. Raser
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John R. Raser: Western Behavioral Sciences Institute, La Jolla, California

Journal of Peace Research, 1965, vol. 2, issue 3, 216-226

Abstract: O. Hobart Mowrer's two-factor model of learning is described by showing its develop ment from Thorndikean, Pavlovian, and Hullian learning theory. The model is then generalized to learning by national actors in an international interaction system, with particular attention to the point that the punishment or rewarding of responses sets up an affective state within the organism (or multi-organism entity) which acts as a prs mary determinant of what future responses will be made. This affective state is one of expectation (fear or hope) that further responses will be either rewarded or punished. When the agent of reward or punishment is seen, not as a neutral environment, but as another sentient or choosing actor in a social system, then the fear or hope become trans lated into hostility or friendship toward that actor. This hostility or friendship will result in either hostility-laden or friendship-laden new responses. Hostile behavior is more apt to be punished, friendly behavior to be rewarded. Thus, the cycle becomes self re-inforcing.The task of diplomacy is to break these cycles by pointing out what behaviors may be rewarded and what must be punished, thus creating an interaction between the actors in which they both learn how to co-exist in the system. At the same time, diplomacy should have the task, when punishment is necessary, to clarify that this punishment is the result of a specific behavior and is not a generalized reaction springing from a view of the other actor as 'evil' or 'bad' due to his very nature.

Date: 1965
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