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Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test

Lesley G. Terris and Zeev Maoz
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Lesley G. Terris: Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University, lesley@post.tau.ac.il
Zeev Maoz: Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis, zmaoz@ucdavis.edu

Journal of Peace Research, 2005, vol. 42, issue 5, 563-583

Abstract: Although mediation between disputing states seems to have become a prevalent method of conflict resolution, especially in the post-Cold War era, the fact remains that in only 35% of all militarized disputes since World War II did some form of third-party mediation take place. This suggests that some conflict situations are more open to mediation than others. This study develops and tests a rational model of the conditions under which mediation will occur in international conflicts. The model explores the mediator’s intervention dilemma in terms of her perceived ability to transform the game that characterizes the present conflict into a game of (partial or complete) cooperation. The measure of conflict versatility is offered to denote the likelihood of, and difficulty involved in, such transformation. It is argued that the greater the versatility of the conflict, (1) the more likely are disputants to seek mediation, (2) the more likely are outside parties to mediate, and (3) the more intrusive the mediation strategies employed. Examining data on Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) since World War II, the authors find substantive support for these hypotheses. The article concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and empirical implications of these findings.

Date: 2005
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