EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The interrogation game

David Johnson () and John Barry Ryan
Additional contact information
John Barry Ryan: Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University

Journal of Peace Research, 2015, vol. 52, issue 6, 822-837

Abstract: While there is widespread debate about techniques for obtaining information from non-cooperative sources, there is little research concerning the efficacy of different methods. We introduce the ‘Interrogation Game’ as a simple model of the information a source will provide when faced with either (1) an interrogator using coercive techniques or (2) an interrogator offering rewards. The model demonstrates that coercive interrogation results in a very slight increase in accurate information from knowledgeable sources, but much more inaccurate information from ignorant sources. In short, when ignorant group members refuse to provide information, this increases the inequality of payoffs among group members under coercion while the same behavior – truthfully revealing ignorance – decreases the inequality of payoffs under reward. If ignorant detainees have concern for the payoffs of their other group members, they will admit their ignorance in reward, but not coercion. We test the model with a group-based experiment. As the model predicts, coercion leads subjects to provide more inaccurate information. Contrary to the model’s expectations, however, accurate information is almost equally likely in the coercion and reward treatments.

Keywords: cooperation; experiments; interrogation; social dilemmas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/52/6/822.abstract (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:joupea:v:52:y:2015:i:6:p:822-837

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Peace Research from Peace Research Institute Oslo
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-22
Handle: RePEc:sae:joupea:v:52:y:2015:i:6:p:822-837