Predicting Hospital Surge after a Large-Scale Anthrax Attack: A Model-Based Analysis of CDC's Cities Readiness Initiative Prophylaxis Recommendations

Nathaniel Hupert, Daniel Wattson, Jason Cuomo, Eric Hollingsworth, Kristof Neukermans and Wei Xiong
Additional contact information
Nathaniel Hupert: Department of Medicine, Weill Medical College of Cornell University, New York, nah2005@med.cornell.edu, New York Presbyterian Hospital, New York, Department of Public Health, Weill Medical College of Cornell University, New York
Daniel Wattson: Washington University School of Medicine, St. Louis, Missouri
Jason Cuomo: Operation USA, Culver City, California
Eric Hollingsworth: Google, Mountain View, California
Kristof Neukermans: Department of Public Health, Weill Medical College of Cornell University, New York
Wei Xiong: Department of Public Health, Weill Medical College of Cornell University, New York

Medical Decision Making, 2009, vol. 29, issue 4, 424-437

Abstract: Background . After a major bioterrorism attack, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) calls for dispensing of medical countermeasures to targeted populations within 48 hours. The authors explore how meeting or missing this 48-hour goal after a hypothetical aerosol anthrax attack would affect hospital surge, in light of the multiple uncertainties surrounding anthrax-related illness and response. Design . The authors created a discrete-time state transition computer model representing the dynamic interaction between disease progression of inhalational anthrax and the rate of dispensing of prophylactic antibiotics in an exposed population. Results . A CRI-compliant prophylaxis campaign starting 2 days after exposure would protect from 86% to 87% of exposed individuals from illness (assuming, in the base case, 90% antibiotic effectiveness and a 95% attack rate). Each additional day needed to complete the campaign would result in, on average, 2.4% to 2.9% more hospitalizations in the exposed population; each additional day's delay to initiating prophylaxis beyond 2 days would result in 5.2% to 6.5% additional hospitalizations. These population protection estimates vary roughly proportionally to antibiotic effectiveness but are relatively insensitive to variations in anthrax incubation period. Conclusion . Delays in detecting and initiating response to large-scale, covert aerosol anthrax releases in a major city would render even highly effective CRI-compliant mass prophylaxis campaigns unable to prevent unsustainable levels of surge hospitalizations. Although outcomes may improve with more rapid epidemiological identification of affected subpopulations and increased collaboration across regional public health and hospital systems, these findings support an increased focus on prevention of this public health threat.

Keywords: anthrax; emergency preparedness; antibiotic prophylaxis; hospital bed capacity; models; decision support; models; theoretical. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:medema:v:29:y:2009:i:4:p:424-437

DOI: 10.1177/0272989X09341389

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