Double Conjunction Fallacies in Physicians’ Probability Judgment

Vincenzo Crupi, Fabrizio Elia, Franco Aprà and Katya Tentori
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Vincenzo Crupi: Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition, Department of Philosophy and Education, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
Fabrizio Elia: Department of Medicine, Local Health Service, Turin, Turin, Italy
Franco AprÃ: Department of Medicine, Local Health Service, Turin, Turin, Italy
Katya Tentori: Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento, Trento, Italy

Medical Decision Making, 2018, vol. 38, issue 6, 756-760

Abstract: We report the first empirical data showing a significant amount of double conjunction fallacies in physicians’ probability judgments concerning prognosis and diagnosis. Our results support the hypothesis that physicians’ probability judgments are guided by assessments of evidential impact between diagnostic conditions and clinical signs. Moreover, we show that, contrary to some influential views, double conjunction fallacies represent an experimentally replicable reasoning bias. We discuss how the phenomenon eludes major current accounts of uncertain reasoning in medicine and beyond and how it relates to clinical practice.

Keywords: clinical reasoning; conjunction fallacy; probability judgment; reasoning bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:medema:v:38:y:2018:i:6:p:756-760

DOI: 10.1177/0272989X18786358

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