Ethnic Bargains, Group Instability, and Social Choice Theory

Kanchan Chandra

Politics & Society, 2001, vol. 29, issue 3, 337-362

Abstract: This article makes two arguments: first, it argues that theories connecting ethnic group mobilization with democratic bargaining are based, often unwittingly, on primordialist assumptions that bias them toward overestimating the intractability of ethnic group demands. Second, it proposes a synthesis of constructivist approaches to ethnic identity and social choice theory to show how we who study ethnic mobilization might build theories that rely on the more realistic and more powerful assumption of instability in ethnic group boundaries and preferences. It illustrates the promise of this approach through a study of the language bargain struck in India's constituent assembly between 1947 and 1949.

Date: 2001
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:29:y:2001:i:3:p:337-362

DOI: 10.1177/0032329201029003002

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