Politics of Revenue Extraction in Post-Communist States: Poland and Russia Compared

Gerald M. Easter

Politics & Society, 2002, vol. 30, issue 4, 599-627

Abstract: Since the late 1990s, a consensus has emerged among scholars of the post-communist transitions that an enfeebled state is not an asset but a liability to a transition economy. Moreover, it is now accepted that underdeveloped fiscal capacity is a leading cause of state weakness in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This article compares the alternative revenue extraction strategies developed by state leaders in post-communist Poland and Russia. It stresses political institutional constraints to explain why Poland opted for a social pact with labor over household incomes, while Russia developed a system of elite bargaining over corporate profits.

Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:30:y:2002:i:4:p:599-627

DOI: 10.1177/003232902237828

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