Labor Migration Policy and the Governance of the Construction Industry in Israel and Japan

David Bartram

Politics & Society, 2004, vol. 32, issue 2, 131-170

Abstract: Significant “guestworker†immigration occurs when the state lacks the capacity to inhibit rent-seeking by private interests that benefit from imported labor. Policies allowing imported labor result in government subsidies for employers’ profits. These subsidies are usefully conceived as rents. A developmentalist state(e.g. Japan) will constrain the creation of such rents, especially because imported labor carries long-term costs not borne by employers and inhibits productivity growth and positive structural change. A clientelist state (e.g. Israel) falls prey to this type of rent-seeking because of a weaker institutional capacity for creating conditions that make alternative solutions feasible and profitable for employers.

Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:32:y:2004:i:2:p:131-170

DOI: 10.1177/0032329204263068

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