Must Exceptionalism Prove the Rule? An Angle on Emergency Government in the History of Political Thought

Nomi Claire Lazar
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Nomi Claire Lazar: Social Sciences Collegiate Division, University of Chicago, 5845 S. Ellis Avenue, Room 305, Chicago, IL 60637; 203-641-6473 nclazar@uchicago.edu

Politics & Society, 2006, vol. 34, issue 2, 245-275

Abstract: Discussions of the problem of emergency powers often assume that norms and exceptions constitute its conceptual structure. This perspective is both self-undermining and dangerous. Because even the critics of emergency powers often rely on this dichotomy, clarifying the conceptual terrain might contribute to the development of a safer approach to emergencies. Hence, this article explores the origins and logic of modern exceptionalism by examining instances of its careful articulation in the history of political thought: in the “republican†exceptionalism of Machiavelli and Rousseau and the “decisionist†exceptionalism of Schmitt and Hobbes.

Keywords: emergency; state of exception; Schmitt; Machiavelli; rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:34:y:2006:i:2:p:245-275

DOI: 10.1177/0032329205285406

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