The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform

John W. Cioffi and Martin Höpner
Additional contact information
John W. Cioffi: University of California, Riverside, john.cioffi@ucr.edu
Martin Höpner: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, Germany, hoepner@mpifg.de

Politics & Society, 2006, vol. 34, issue 4, 463-502

Abstract: A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties’ established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform.

Keywords: corporate governance; finance capitalism; center-left parties; economic reform; financial regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0032329206293642 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:polsoc:v:34:y:2006:i:4:p:463-502

DOI: 10.1177/0032329206293642

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Politics & Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SAGE Publications ().